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NOTES AND COMMENTS
statutory allowance of a deduction by a candidate for reasonable
campaign expenditures as expenses incurred for the production of
income should be permitted.3 ' However, two decades have passed
since McDonald; apparently the courts are themselves ready to take
action.
BROWN HILL BOSWELL
Torts-Damages-Aggravation of Pre-existing Injuries
On February 11, 1963, while the plaintiff in Lockwood v. Mc-
Caskill' was waiting for a traffic light to change, his automobile was
struck in the rear by defendant's truck. He was unconscious
momentarily and later suffered headaches accompanied by pain in
his neck, back, hips and left leg. Because of this pain he was unable
to return to the operation of his service station until May 1. During
his absence an employee wrecked a customer's car, forcing plaintiff
to pay damages in the amount of 1,200 dollars. Plaintiff, "'basically
.. an insecure person .... a perfectionist .... a worrisome individ-
ual,' "2 brooded about his financial difficulties in meeting payrolls and
other expenses. He had difficulty sleeping because of this worry,
pain, and headaches. On the morning of May 20, more than three
months after the accident, he suffered an attack of amnesia and was
hospitalized until June 15, 1963. During his stay he suffered periods
of confusion and depression.
At the trial plaintiff's psychiatrist testified to the effect that
"the accident and resulting physical injuries would not have caused
amnesia in a person with ordinary susceptibility to worry and in-
secure feelings, but that plaintiff is more than ordinarily prone to
suffer from these mental conditions. ... "' It was further stated
that the
attack of amnesia was induced by a deep sense of insecurity,
that... the injuries he suffered in the accident and the financial
burdens and losses caused by his physical incapacity to work and
" 4 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 25A.17. See Diamond, The Shadow
of McDonald, 23 TAxEs 511, 515 (1945); 39 ILL. L. Rnv. 298 (1945).
1262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964).
2 Id. at 666, 138 S.E.2d at 543.
Id. at 670, 138 S.E.2d at 546.
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attend to his business threatened his security and produced mental
stress and worry, and this mental state set the stage for the am-
nesia attack, which was precipitated . . .4
by the employee wrecking the customer's car.
The court, in allowing recovery, held that
if the defendant's act would not have resulted in any injury to an
ordinary person, he is not liable for its harmful consequences to
one of peculiar susceptibility ... but if his misconduct amounted
to a breach of duty to a person of ordinary susceptibility, he is
liable for all damages suffered by plaintiff notwithstanding the
fact these damages were unusually extensive because of peculiar
susceptibility. 5
The court was applying what is commonly called the "special
sensitivity" or "thin skull" rule.' According to this rule, once an
impact upon the person of the plaintiff has occurred, the tort-
feasor takes his victim as he finds him,7 even though, because of
some peculiar bodily sensitivity, the injury suffered is much greater
than that which would have been sustained by an ordinary indi-
vidual. The wrongdoer is not allowed to mitigate his damages
because his particular victim has a dormant or incipient disease or a
pre-existing physical injury. Thus, when the impact arouses plain-
tiff's bony tumor,8 aggrevates his spondylolisthesesp or peptic
ulcer,"0 lowers his vitality causing him to contract tuberculosis," or
aggravates his speech impediment causing a notable increase in his
"Id. at 669, 138 S.E.2d at 546.
Id. at 670, 138 S.E.2d at 546.
The phrase seems to have originated in the language of Kennedy, J.,
in the English case of Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.
If a man is negligently run over or otherwise negligently injured
in his body, it is no answer to the sufferer's claim for damages that
he would have suffered less injury, or no injury at all, if he had not
had an unusually thin skull or an unusually weak heart.
Id. at 679.
"E.g., United States v. Fotopulos, 180 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1950); Guil-
lory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955);
Jonte v. Key System, 89 Cal. App. 2d 654, 201 P.2d 562 (Dist. Ct. App.
1949); Delpido v. Colony, 52 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1951). See generally
15 Am. JUR. Damages §§ 80-81 (1938); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 21 (1941);
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 461 (1934).
8Garrett v. Taylor, 69 Idaho 487, 210 P.2d 386 (1949).
'Rideau v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 124 Cal. App. 2d 466, 268 P.2d
772 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
"
0Land v. Colletti, 79 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 1955).
"Hazelwood v. Hodge, 357 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1961).
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stuttering, 2 the defendant is held liable even though such con-
sequences could not have been reasonably foreseen.
Plaintiff in Lockwood is to be distinguished from the plaintiffs
in the above cases because his pre-existing condition was mental
rather than physical. He could be more accurately described as
having "thin skin" in lieu of a "thin skull."
Quaere then, does the tort-feasor take his neurotic' 3 or psy-
chotic'4 plaintiff as he finds him? In other words, is there also a
"thin skin" rule? The courts that have considered the plaintiff with
the precarious emotional imbalance indicate that the answer should
be in the affirmative.' 5 As stated by one court: "conceding plain-
tiff to be a neurotic nature-even conceding him to be psycho-
neurotic, such admission can be of little comfort to defendants. It
is well settled that the tort-feasor takes his victim as he finds
him.. .. , Thus courts have allowed recovery when plaintiff suf-
fers a "traumatic neurosis"' 7 following a bump on the chin, "con-
version hysteria s"' accompanying a fracture of the wrist and hand, a
1" Gallo v. American Egg Co., 76 R.I. 450, 72 A.2d 166 (1950).
" Neurosis or psychoneurosis is a form of maladjustment in which a
person, although well in touch with reality, uses physical complaints and
symptoms to express psychological needs which have arisen from conflicts
that are hidden from the conscious mind. Neuroses are generally divided
into four types: anxiety neurosis, hysteria, psychoasthenia, and mixed types.
Palmer, Traumatic Neuroses, 15 O0o ST. L. J. 399 (1954).
" A psychosis is a severe form of personality disease character-
ized by an extensive disorganization of the various functions. In
the typical psychosis the individual has lost his contact with reality
and reveals severe disturbances in all areas of his life. The
psychotic reaction is a much more thoroughly and severely ab-
normal type of personality reaction than is the psychoneurosis.
ENGLISH & FINCH, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHIATRY 43 (2d ed. 1957).
" Thomas v. United States, 327 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1964); Evans v. S. J.
Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1963); Hambleton v. United
States, 87 F. Supp. 994 (W.D. Wash. 1949); Purity Ice Co. v. Triplett, 257
Ala. 116, 57 So. 2d. 540 (1952); Pederson v. Carrier, 91 Cal. App. 2d 84,
204 P.2d 417 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Stark v. Yellow Cab Co., 90 Cal. App.
2d 217, 202 P.2d 802 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949) ; Flood v. Smith, 126 Conn. 644,
13 A.2d 677 (1940); Kraus v. Osteen, 135 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1961); Irwin v.
St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 325 Mo. 1019, 30 S.W.2d 56 (1930); Kadair v. Pitts-
burgh Ry., 383 Pa. 50, 117 A.2d 712 (1955); Port Terminal Ry. Ass'n v.
Ross, 278 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Love v. Port of London
Authority [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 541; Bates v. Fraser, [1963] 1 Ont. 539,
38 D.L.R.2d 30; Enge v. Trerise, [1961] 26 D.L.R.2d 529; Smith v.
Christie Brown & Co., [1955] Ont. 301.
"Briley v. North River Ins. Co., 161 So. 2d 449, 459 (La. App. 1963).
'
7 Landrath v. Allstate Ins. Co., 259 Wis. 248, 48 N.W.2d 485 (1951).
The American Psychiatric Association does not officially recognize the term
"traumatic" as descriptive of a form of neurosis. Modlin, The Trauma in
Trau atic Neuroses, 24 MENNEGER CLINIC BULL. 49, 50 (1960).
" Davidson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 105 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
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"psychoneurotic anxiety reaction"'" following a knee injury, and
"reactive depression"2 accompanying a slight injury to the back.
One way of analyzing the "thin skull" cases is to view them as a
proximate cause problem. In one of the leading cases in this field,
Re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co.," the court reasoned that to
determine whether an act is negligent, it is relevant to determine
whether any reasonable person could foresee that the act would cause
damage; if so, the fact that the damage that it caused is not the exact
kind of damage one would expect is immaterial as long as the
damage is traceable to the negligent act. This is sometimes referred
to as the "causation" approach.22 Given a breach of duty which
amounts to negligence, and damage directly resulting from that
negligence, the fact that the damage which ensues is different from
the damage that would be expected is irrelevant. Foreseeability is
used here only to determine whether the tort-feasor was negligent
in the first instance, but it is not at all determinative of the extent
of the damages for which he will be liable once negligence is proven.
The Lockwood court apparently adopted this rationale when it
stated that "the measure of duty in determining whether a wrong
has been committed is distinct from the measure of liability when
the wrong has been committed." 23
Polemis was overruled forty years later by Overseas Tankship
(U.K.) Ltd. v. Mort's Dock & Eng'r Co.,2 4 commonly referred to
as Wagon Mound.25 In Wagon Mound the court refused to follow
the rule allowing damages for the direct but unforeseeable con-
sequences of a wrongful act. The court reasoned that it would be
unjust to hold a defendant liable in negligence for damages of a
kind which he could not have reasonably foreseen, although he may
have reasonably foreseen that some damage might occur. Liability
was limited to the scope of the risk created by the defendant's con-
duct. This limitation would restrict liability within the scope of the
risk originally created, and make foreseeability the test both for
responsibility, i.e., liability for damages, and for negligence. Thus,
if one has breached a duty of care because he should have foreseen
" Feeley v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Pa. 1963).2 Lefeune v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 105 So. 2d 327 (La. App. 1958).
21 [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
' PROSSER, TORTS 303 (3d ed. 1964); Williams, The Risk Principle, 77
L.Q. REv. 179, 180 (1961).
23 262 N.C. at 670, 138 S.E.2d at 546-47.
[1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.) (N.S.W.).
25The name of the ship involved in the case.
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a particular type of risk, he is negligent by his breach and liable for
the harm which he could have reasonably foreseen, but he is not
liable for results which occur outside of that risk-as to those re-
sults, he is simply not negligent.
Whether or not the "thin skull" and "thin skin" cases are to be
considered an exception of the foreseeability test of Wagon Mound
will depend upon the meaning given to the phrase "damage ... of
such a kind as the reasonable man should have foreseen."2 6 For
example, "kind" could be interpreted as meaning either "personal"
or "physical" injury. If it is interpreted as meaning personal injury,
then, if defendant could foresee that some personal injury would
occur it may be argued that he would be liable for all physical and
emotional injury that did occur because it is of the same "kind" that
was foreseeable. However, if "kind" is interpreted as meaning
"physical" injury, then "psychic" or "emotional" injury is of a
different "kind" than that which could have been reasonably fore-
seen, and the "thin skin" cases would appear to be a exception to
the foreseeability rule.
The English courts deciding "thin skull" cases since Wagon
Mound have considered them an exception to the foreseeability rule.
As one court states, "Wagon Mound... did not have what I may
call, loosely, the thin skull cases in mind."2 7
In the field of intentional torts it is generally agreed that when
a defendant is liable because he has intentionally inflicted harm,2 8
his liability is not restricted to the harm intended; the range of
responsibility widens with the degree of culpability of his conduct.2"
However, in the "thin skull" cases there is no widening of responsi-
bility once the defendant is negligent, the doors are wide open for
20 [1961] A.C. 388, 426 (P.C.) (N.S.W.).
, Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., [1962] 2 Q.B. 405, 414.
" Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1960); St. Petersburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cuccinello, 44 So. 2d
670 (Fla. 1950); Wyant v. Crouse, 127 Mich. 158, 86 N.W. 527 (1901);
Corn v. Sheppard, 179 Minn. 490, 229 N.W. 869 (1930) ; Kopka v. Bell Tel.
Co., 371 Pa. 444, 91 A.2d 232 (1952) ; Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124,
125 S.E. 244 (1924).
"0 "In determining how far the law will trace causation and afford a
remedy, the facts as to the defendant's intent, his imputable knowledge, or
his justifiable ignorance are often taken into account.... For an intended in-jury the law is astute to discover even very remote causation." Derosier v.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 463-64, 130 Atl. 145, 152
(1925) (dictum). See cases collected in Bauer, The Degree of Defendant's
Fault as Affecting the Administration of the Law of Excessive Compen-
satory Damages, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 583 (1934).
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plaintiff and defendant will be held responsible for all damage. Ob-
jection may be made to this rule on the ground that it imposes
liability which may be far in excess of the slight dereliction in de-
fendant's conduct. A defendant who was guilty only of a minor
breach of duty may find his whole fortune exhausted because he was
unfortunate enough to strike a particular "sensitive" plaintiff. To
this objection the courts have answered that as between the wrong-
doer and the innocent plaintiff, there may be good reason for letting
the tort-feasor pay. Even though the defendant may have to bear
an unreasonable loss, he at least caused that loss and rather he
should suffer than an entirely innocent plaintifff 0
Assuming that the "he caused it, he should pay for it" reasoning
is acceptable when applied to the "thin skull" plaintiffs, would it
also be acceptable when applied to "thin skin" plaintiffs? It is sub-
mitted that it would not.
The "thin skin" cases are distinguishable in many ways. It is
suggested that the problem of causation is much more obscure in the
"thin skin" cases. Can it be said that defendant's negligence was
a "substantial factor"31 in causing plaintiff's post accident condi-
tion; or, "but for""2 defendant's negligence plaintiff would not have
become neurotic? According to the Freudian theory neurosis or
psychosis have their roots in childhood conflict. 83 The origin of
neurosis lies in the emotional and mental conflicts which the indi-
vidual has not resolved but has suppressed in the subconscious.84
In order for it to develop there must be a pre-existing emotional
state or readiness for the neurosis. One author lists six factors "
"E.g., Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890 (1938);
Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957). It would seem
to beg the question to argue "If the loss is out of all proportion to the defen-
dant's fault, it can be no less out of proportion to the plaintiff's innocence."
Prosser, Palsgraf, Revisited, 52 MicH. L. Rnv. 1, 17 (1953). "That obvious
truism [referring to Prosser] could be urged by every person who might
adversely feel some lingering effect of the defendant's conduct, and we
would then be thrown back into the fantastic realm of infinite liability."
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 315, 379 P.2d 513,
525, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 45 (1963).
" A "formula" used to determine actual cause. See PROSSER, TORTS 244
(3d ed. 1964).
" The second formula for actual cause. Ibid.
" ENGLISH & FINCH, op. cit. supra note 14, at 101-02.
" Id. at 41; Smith, Cross-Examination of Neuropsychiatric Testimony in
Personal Injury Cases, 4 VAND. L. Rzv. 1, 37 (1950).
" They are inheritance, age enoch, sex, environmental factors, occupa-
tion and previous attacks. PEARSON, STREcIiE'S FUNDAMENTALS OF PSY-
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which are of significance in causing mental illness; another 8 likens
this pre-existing emotional state to a "vase" with an invisible flaw.
Assuming these authorities are correct, the "thin skin" plaintiff is
not "caused" to develop his neurosis as a new or original condition.
He should be viewed as possessing a pre-existing "injury'" 7 and
his condition following defendant's negligence should be considered
as an aggravation of that pre-existing injury with the neurotic
constitution being the major factor in plaintiff's injury.
If the tort-feasor is to take his "thin skin" plaintiff as he finds
him, the pre-accident personality of the plaintiff should be closely
considered to determine what part of the total injury represents
the pre-existing one. The court should also determine whether the
pre-existing condition was bound to worsen, in which event an ap-
propriate discount should be made for the damage that would have
been suffered in the absence of the defendant's negligence.
Secondly, it is submitted that the neurotic reaction precipitated
by defendant's negligence is in many cases much more extreme 8
than the physical reaction suffered by the "thin skull" plaintiff.
It has been suggested that there is no relationship between the ex-
tent of the physical injury plaintiff sustained and the severity of
the subsequent neurosis., 9 One author who has made an extensive
study in neurosis following accident cases concludes that they
"demonstrate an inverse relationship of accident neurosis to the
cHIATRY 15 (6th ed. 1963). The author cites the following example to show
how the factors produced a mental illness:
[T]hat the patient was born in difficult instrumental labor; that
there was head trauma at the age of 4; that the patient's father
"favored" an older child; that at the age of 10 she was frightened
by a tramp who exposed his sexual organs to her; that at the age
of 12 she was "upset" by her first menstrual period for which she
had not been prepared; that at 15 she broke her wrist, and it was
badly set and left a deformity; that at 19 she had a very unhappy
love experience ....
Id. at 28-29.
Miller, Accident Neurosis, 29 INs. COUNSEL J. 297, 311 (1962).
' Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. REv. 87,
120 (1943).
8'Di Mare v. Cresci, 23 Cal. 772, 373 P.2d 860 (1962); Levy v.
Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 8 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 1942);
Widener v. St. Louis Pub. Sec. Co., 360 Mo. 761, 230 S.W.2d 698 (1950);
Griffiths v. Shaffrey, 283 App. Div. 604, 129 N.Y.S.2d 74, aff'd, 308 N.Y.
729, 124 N.E.2d 339 (1954); Osgood v. D. W. Winkelman Co., 274 App.
Div. 694, 87 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1949); Rice-Stix Dry Goods Co. v. Self, 20
Tenn. App. 498, 101 S.W.2d 132 (1935).
"PAGE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 149 (1947); Shannon, Post Traumatic
Neuroses, 28 INs. COUNSEL J. 472, 474 (1961).
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severity of the injury, ' 40 in other words, the more severe the injury
the less likely it is to precipitate a neurosis. It has also been sug-
gested that it is not the physical nature of the injury that is im-
portant in precipitating the neurosis but rather the emotional and
symbolic meaning given the injury.41 This is demonstrated by a
recent Michigan case, in which defendant's truck ran into the rear
of a soft drink truck driven by plaintiff. Plaintiff was not seriously
injured, but the liquid dripping from the broken bottles caused him
to think his gasoline tanks had ruptured. The dripping noise re-
called a previous accident that he had witnessed in which two per-
sons were burned to death in a gasoline fire. As a result plaintiff
became psychotic and unable to work. He received a 150,000 dollar
verdict.42
Thirdly, it is difficult to determine the extent and duration4 8
of plaintiff's emotional condition. Present is the possibility that
plaintiff is suffering only from a "compensation neurosis." Here,
as in other forms of neuroses, plaintiff is not malingering, but
sincerely believes in the reality of his symptoms. His symptoms,
however, are produced primarily by his subconscious desire for
compensation. Prognosis is poor until he receives some type of
fiscal therapy, preferably in the form of a speedy settlement.44
Today more than one-half of all hospital beds are occupied by
mental patients.45 The National Committee Against Mental Illness
estimates that one out of every ten Americans is now suffering
from some form of mental illness, 40 and with personal injury litiga-
tion assuming a greater proportion in the law, many "thin skin"
plaintiffs will be coming before the courts. It would appear that
serious questions of public policy are involved when an emotionally
imbalanced individual is given a large verdict as a result of a slight
physical injury inflicted by a stable, productive individual. It is
suggested that letting the tort-feasor take his neurotic plaintiff as
he finds him is not the way to solve our mental health problem.
"' Miller, supra note 36, at 298. Miller also relates the incidence of
accident neurosis to social status. Most of the people who "developed gross
neurotic sequence were unskilled or semi-skilled workers." Id. at 298-99.
"Palmer, supra note 13, at 399.
"Time, Feb. 14, 1964, p. 75.
"Smith, supra note 34, at 42-43.
"PAGE, op. cit. supra note 39, at 150.
"PEARSON, op. cit. supra note 35, at 1.
"Id. at 4.
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The attitude of some courts in their consideration of "thin skin"
plaintiffs is reflected by the lawyers' joke which defines "emotional
trauma as a 'state of mind precipitated by an accident, stimulated
by an attorney, perpetuated by avarice and cured by a verdict.' ,4
THOMAS E. CAPPS
Torts-Products Liability-Sale Requirement
The decline of the requirement of a sale in the field of products
liability parallels the decline of the requirement of privity.' Both
are being replaced by "strict tort liability."
Delaney v. Towmotor Corp.2 reveals the final stage of this de-
velopment. The court in Delaney held a manufacturer of a defective
fork lift strictly liable to an injured employee of a prospective
buyer who had the lift on a demonstration loan directly from the
manufacturer. In overcoming the defendant's argument of "no sale,
no warranty," the court went beyond the recognition that a sale is
not always a requisite of warranty and stated that products liability
should no longer be characterized as warranty liability but rather as
"strict tort liability."3
In the past, products liability has been limited and confined by
the uncertain nature and character of warranty-more specifically
by the contractual barriers associated with it." Although the require-
ment of privity is said to be the major deterrent to new frontiers
of products liability,' the idea that warranty requires a "sale" also
has been an obstacle. It is said that goods are warranted only when
supplied under a contract to sell or a sale,6 generating the conten-
' Time, Feb. 14, 1964, p. 75.
'For a distinction between the two requirements, see, e.g., Epstein v.
Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963) (elimination
of the privity requirement having no effect on the force of the sale re-
quirement) ; Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat of Kennewick, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d
468, 374 P.2d 549 (1962) (benefit of a privity exception having no effect
upon the sale requirement).
339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964).
'Id. at 6.
'Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
'l1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY § 3 (1964).
'UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15. Although North Carolina has not adopted
the Uniform Sales Act, it could easily be indirectly applied since the act
is recognized as a codification of the common law. McCarley v. Wood
Drugs, Inc., 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446 (1934). Also, recent North Caro-
lina cases state that warranty is an element in a contract of sale. See
19651 1019
